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Administrative Cutoff of Federal Funding Under
Title VI: A Proposed Interpretation of "Program"
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 provides a powerful method by
which the federal government can deny financial support to any activity
or program which results in discrimination on the grounds of race, color or
national origin. The Act sets forth a detailed administrative process
whereby compliance with the requirement of nondiscrimination in feder-
ally funded programs is to be achieved.2 The ultimate sanction, a
termination of federal funds for the program, may result if, after a hearing
on the record, a finding of discrimination is made by the agency involved. 3
'42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-d4 (1970) [hereinafter cited as the Act]. Originally passed as section
601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970) states:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal finanacial
assistance.
242 U.S.C. § 2000d-I (1970), originally enacted as section 602 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, states:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal
financial assistance to any program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or contract
other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed to
effectuate the provisions of section 2000d of this title with respect to such program
or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which
shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the
financial assistance in connection with which the action is taken. No such rule,
regulation, or order shall become effective unless and until approved by the
President. Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section may
be effected (1) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance
under such program or activity to any recipient as to whom there has been an
express finding on the record, after opportunity for hearing, of a failure to comply
with such requirement, but such termination or refusal shall be limited to the
particular political entity, or part thereof, or other recipient as to whom such a
finding has been made and, shall be limited in its effect to the particular program,
or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has been so found, or (2) by any other
means authorized by law: Provided, however, That no such action shall be taken
until the department or agency, concerned has advised the appropriate person or
persons of the failure to comply with the requirement and has determined that
compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means. In the case of any action
terminating or refusing to grant or continue, assistance because of failure to
comply with a requirement imposed pursuant to this section, the head of the
Federal department or agency shall file with the committees of the House and
Senate having legislative jurisdiction over the program or activity involved a full
written report of the circumstances and the grounds for such action. No such action
shall become effective until thirty days have elapsed after the filing of such report.
'This is known as the pinpoint provision and is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1(1)
(1970). See [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2385, 2512, quoting testimony of HEW
Secretary Anthony J. Celebrezze. The pinpoint provision first appeared in the Mansfield-
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In order to best serve the purpose of Title VI, nondiscrimination in
federally financed programs, the administrative agencies must be able to
use the threat of fund terminiation in its most effective manner. To do so,
the threatened termination must be directed toward an appropriate entity,
consonant with congressional intent to force the aid recipient into
compliance with the Act. Yet on the critical point of what constitutes a
"program," the statute is conclusory and unenlightening. It is, for
example, unclear whether the cutoff should encompass funding for an
entire state, a city, a school system or school district, a single school, a
housing district, one housing project or the recipients of one grant. A
useful definition of the term "program" for Title VI purposes is therefore
necessary. This note will focus on such a definition, one that is flexible in
scope and is most likely to lead to an end to discrimination in federally
financed programs.
Title VI is necessarily written in general terms because it applies to all
recipients of federal aid, a widely varied group. To properly enforce the
terms of the statute, agencies and courts which review agency action4 must
have some flexibility in defining the term "program" to fit the needs of
each situation. Trying to impose a single definition of a Title VI
"program" on administrative processes adapted to a variety of needs will
inevitably frustrate underlying policy considerations. For example, many
cases seeking to enforce Title VI have dealt with discrimination in
educational systems5 and housing developments, 6 but there have also been
instances of the Act's application to eliminate discrimination in mental
health facilities 7 and police departments. 8 There has, as well, been an
Dirksen substitute for the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which was introduced to help insure
passage in the Senate when it became obvious that the House version could not pass.
Comment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964-Implementation and Impact, 36 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 824, 836 (1968).
4Judicial review is authorized under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, section 602, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d-2 (1970):
Any department or agency action taken pursuant to section 2000d-1 of this title
shall be subject to such judicial review as may otherwise be provided by law for
similar action taken by such department or agency on other grounds. In the case of
action, not otherwise subject to judicial review, terminating or refusing to grant or
to continue finanacial assistance upon a finding of failure to comply with any
requirement imposed pursuant to section 2000d- 1 of this title, any person aggrieved
(including any State or political subdivision thereof and any agency of either) may
obtain judicial review of such action in accordance with section 1009 of Title 5, and
such action shall not be deemed committed to unreviewable agency discretion
within the meaning of that section.
The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970), also gives a general right to review:
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected
or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to
judicial review thereof.
5E.g., Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969). See notes 31-37
infra & text accompanying.
6E.g., Gautreaux v. Romney, 457 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1972). See notes 56-64 infra & text
accompanying.7Marable v. Alabama Mental Health Bd., 297 F. Supp. 291 (M.D. Ala. 1969). A finding
was made that all mental health institutions in the state were segregated on the basis of race.
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attempt to cut off federal financing of a city's new sewer system and
outdoor wildlife preserve because of discrimination by the city in other
parts of its operations.9 To the extent these programs are not administered
in a uniform fashion, decisionmaking regarding the termination of
funding under the Act cannot be approached on a single level.
Courts have found different meanings for the word "program" with no
degree of consensus. Although they appear to believe that a single
definition is proper and have attempted to harmonize their definitions, they
have been largely unsuccessful. Divergent judicial interpretations are not
necessarily cause for concern, however, insofar as they serve to effectuate the
ultimate legislative purpose of eliminating discrimination. A discussion of
the various positions taken by the courts on the meaning of the term
"program" will show that a variable definition best effectuates the
legislative intent.
The Act provides for the termination of federal funding if a finding of
discrimination is made.'0  The drastic action of termination is not,
however, the first step taken subsequent to such a finding. The first step is
to require that the receipient of aid cease the discriminatory activity and
redress the resulting injury." For example, the practice in school
"Several provisions of the Code of Alabama require or contemplate that patients be assigned
and treated separately upon basis of their race and color." Id. at 293. Furthermore, facilities
and treatment were not only separate but generally inferior for blacks. The institutions
received an average of $200,000 per year from federal grants and another $200,000 per year in
surplus food commodities under federal programs. A few attempts were made to desegregate
but were countered by the Governor of Alabama. Id. at 294-96.
After an investigation, HEW recommended removal of all federal assistance until the
institutions came into compliance with Title VI. The court ordered a desegregation plan to
be put into effect which would permit the state "to become eligible again for federal assistance
in the full range of its mental health program." Id. at 298.
sUnited States v. City of Chicago, 395 F. Supp. 329 (N.D. Ill. 1975). The federal
government cut off all revenue sharing funds for the city of Chicago on the basis of a finding
that the city's police department, which received part of these funds, practiced discrimination.
The city claimed that not all funds should be affected, citing Gautreaux v. Romney, 457 F.2d
124 (7th Cir. 1972). See notes 48-53 infra & text accompanying.
The court held that since 75 percent of the revenue sharing funds went to the police and
the city may have been liable for $135 million already improperly distributed, the federal
government was correct in not disbursing any more such funds to prevent further liability.
9Evans v. Lynn, 537 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1975), rehearing en banc, 537 F.2d 589 (1976). The
court first found standing for the nonresident plaintiffs to sue in an attempt to terminate
federal financial assistance for a new sewer system and outdoor wildlife preserve because the
city had failed to assess the racial impact which the allocation of funds for these purposes
would have on housing patterns. However, after the Supreme Court's decision in Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), on the subject of standing, the Second Circuit determined en banc
that plaintiffs here lacked standing to raise a question under Title VI as they could not show
they sustained an injury as a result of appellees' actions.
1"42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1970). Full text is cited in note 2 supra.
"The Supreme Court has said, in discussing the role of a federal district court where
state involvement in racial discrimination has been found that the courts have "not merely the
power but the duty to render. a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the
discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discriminatory effects in the future."
Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965). The Court has also required that all
available remedial techniques be considered in desegregation cases. See, e.g., North Carolina
Bd. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 46 (1971); Recent Decisions 65 ILL. B. J. 164, 165 (1976).
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desegregation cases since Brown v. Board of Educationt2 and the enactment
of the 1964 Act is for the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
(often aided by court intervention) to order the offending party to
integrate," with the threatened loss of funds hanging in the background.' 4
12347 U.S. 483 (1954).
I3E.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973) (where a policy of deliberate
segregation was proved for a significant part of a school system, the burden was on the school
board to prove that similarly segregated schools were not also the result of a segregative intent
or the district court had the authority to order a desegregation decree to cover all the schools so
affected); Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972) (where Emporia changed from a
town to a city in order to withdraw its children from the county school system which was
operating under a desegregation plan; the district court was to be guided by the effect of the
officials' action and not their motivation and was justified in concluding that the city's
establishment of a separate school system would impede the progress of desegregating the
county schools; the court therefore did not abuse its discretion in enjoining respondents from
pursuing their plan to set up a separate school system); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd.
of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (after the school board defaulted in its obligation to offer an
acceptable plan for desegregation, the district court could use broad powers to assure a unitary
system, including appointment of an expert and ordering the adoption of his plan, a limited
use of a racial ratio as an indicia of segregation, altering of attendance zones and busing);
Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (where a "freedom of choice" plan for
students would offer a real chance of producing a unitary school system, it might be
acceptable but where other speedier, more effective methods exist, as here, such plan was not
acceptable.and the district court was obligated to retain jurisdiction until the state-imposed
segregation, was ended); Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (an injunction
against local school officials preventing them from closing county schools to avoid
desegregating them, while at the same time providing tuition grants and tax credits to assist
white children to go to private schools was appropriate); Haney v. County Bd., 410 F.2d 920
(8th Cir. 1969) (although state law did not require school districts to be racially segregated, as
an earlier law required schools to be, the fact that reorganized districts were divided racially
was considered more than coincidental, and the school board was ordered to submit a workable
plan to effectuate a nonracial school system to be approved by the district court for the next
school year).
The remedial action in these and other cases, dealing with racial and other suspect class
discrimination not only in the schools but wherever found, was often triggered by
examination of the impact of the laws or policies on the suspect class. An inference arose that
an invidious discriminatory purpose existed if the impact was more severe on one class than
another. However, the Supreme Court has recently amended this position:
Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an
invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution. Standing alone it
does not trigger the rule ... that racial classifications are to be subjected to the
strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of considerations.
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
At the very least, the Court's discussion raises a question of how school, housing and
other discrimination cases will be handled in the future. See id. at 243-45 & 244, n.12.
Apparently, a discriminatory purpose rather than merely discriminatory impact must be
shown before strict scrutiny is required; it remains to be seen what proof of such purpose will
be accepted.
14Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, has recently made
known his department's intention to take full advantage of this power. See N.Y. Times, Feb.
20, 1977, § E, at 5, col. 5.
Executive Order No. 11764, 39 Fed. Reg. 3575 (1974), reprinted at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1
(Supp. V 1975), gave to the Attorney General the power granted to the President in the Act to
coordinate enforcement of Title VI.
However, proposed rules under this order were not printed in the Federal Register until
July 29, 1976, see 41 Fed. Reg. 31, 550 (1976). A new subsection was added to 28 C.F.R. §§42.1-
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Resolution of housing cases has followed similar lines under the guidance of
the Department of Housing and Urban Development. 15 Under section 602
42.308 on December 1, 1976, see 41 Fed. Reg. 52, 669 (1976), implementing the order, effective
January 3, 1977. The agencies still have primary responsibility for enforcing Title VI; they are
to submit enforcement programs to the Attorney General rather than the President for
approval. Each agency is also to publish Title VI guidelines. The agencies themselves are to
submit lists of programs which are covered by Title VI. These new regulations, as well as the
rest of Nondiscrimination; Equal Employment Opportunity; Policies and Procedures 28
C.F.R. §§42.1-42.308, and Guidelines for the enforcement of Title VI, Civil Rights Act of 1964,
28 C.F.R. §50.3 (1976), have the potential of providing a reasonable route for proper
enforcement of Title VI. As always, however, the success of that venture will depend on the
zeal with which it is pursued. If the new Secretary of HEW is speaking for this
administration's stand on nondiscrimination in all federally financed programs, perhaps
compliance with Title VI will be forthcoming.
The only definition of "program" in the new regulations is in 28 C.F.R. § 42.402(c):
'Program' refers to programs and activities receiving federal financial assistance of the type
subject to Title VI." Earlier in the regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 42.102(d) (1976), the definition is as
follows: "The term 'program' includes any program, project, or activity for the provision of
services, financial aid, or other benefits to individuals ... or for the provision of facilities for
furnishing services, financial aid, or other benefits to individuals .. " The agencies will need
a more practical definition than is found in the regulations. It seems reasonable that Congress
used this general terminology in the regulations because it was expected that each agency
would have its own definition, depending on the way that agency works.
See also discussion infra note 68.
15E.g., United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422
U.S. 1042 (1975) (suit was allowed against local zoning officials where they adopted an
ordinance which prohibited construction of new multi-family dwellings and which effected
the segregation of low-income blacks from all white neighborhoods); Otero v. New York Hous.
Auth., 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973) (a housing authority had the burden of showing a claimed
intent of preventing a "tipping" effect in a new housing project when it limited the number
of apartments rented to nonwhites); Crow v. Brown, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972) (denial of
building permits to exclude low-income blacks from obtaining apartments in a tract already
zoned for apartments was found to be a violation of the equal protection clause); Kennedy
Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
1010 (1971) (a city was not allowed to suddenly declare a moratorium on the building of new
subdivisions and tying in to the sewer system when a low-income housing project was
proposed); Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 265 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. 11. 1967) (all blacks and
tenants in or applicants for public housing had standing to challenge the validity of the site
selection policy of a housing authority); El Cortez Heights Residents & Property Owners Ass'n
v. Tucson Hous. Auth., 10 Ariz. App. 132, 457 P.2d 294 (1969) (a housing authority could not
choose sites for federally funded housing projects which effectively resulted in a segregated
racial composition in the area).
Commentators have reacted in other ways, with suggestions that the usual remedies do
little to prevent the ultimate effect of "white flight" from the inner cities and that primary
forces such as suburban exclusionary land use policies should be attacked. See, e.g., Ragsdale,
Constitutional Approaches to Metropolitan Planning, 5 URa. LAw. 447, 451-52 (1973). Also,
site selection of public housing projects is seen to be an important factor in controlling
entrenchment of segregation in the center cities and acceleration of racial transition on the
fringes of a ghetto. Id. at 464-67.
Most recently, the Supreme Court has carried its decision in Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229 (1976), see note 10 supra, into effect as promised ttierein, 426 U.S. at 244 n.12. The
Court reiterated that the lower courts could not take racially discriminatory impact alone as
sufficient proof of a motive to discriminate, such motive being required to show a violation of
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977). The village, which has only twenty-seven
blacks out of 64,000 residents, refused to rezone an area to accommodate a low and middle-
income housing development. The Court said that there must be a stark pattern of racial
discrimination before impact alone would be sufficient for a finding of a violation of- the
1977]
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of the Act the government is charged with seeking voluntary compliance
with an acceptable integration plan before considering termination of
funding.1 6 Eliminating funds is not an automatic sanction. Indeed, one
district court has recently stated that the government must go to great
lengths to seek voluntary state compliance with the Act before moving to
cut off federal funds.' 7 On that basis relatively few cases actually reach a
point of eliminating federal financial assistance. 18 Because the intention of
the Act is to prevent or to end segregation and not to cause financial
hardships, 19 Title VI gives relatively vague guidelines regarding the cutoff
of funds. An examination of the pertinent cases in light of the legislative
history reveals the difficulty the courts have encountered in construing
section 602 of the statute.
CURRENT TREATMENT OF THE PROBLEM
A Common Beginning to Analysis: Legislative History
Courts have sought support for their varying analyses in the legislative
history of the Act. However, because each court has cited only those
parts of the Congressional Record which support its preconceived defini-
tions, 20 the legislative history has not proved to be very enlightening.
Congress seems to have glossed over the problem of defining "pro-
gram" in their haste to read the crucial issue of discrimination. 2' One
Representative in his discussion of section 602 hinted that a "program"
referred to loan or grant money.2 2 He suggested that the bill could
"provide that recipients of Federal financial assistance, as a condition to
receiving the grant or loan, must enter into an enforceable undertaking
against discrimination in the administration of the program." 23  This,
equal protection clause. The other evidence that the Court suggested might be examined
included the historical background of the decision, the specific sequence of events leading up to
the decision, any procedural or substantive departures from routine, and the legislative or
administrative history. Id. at 564-65. The Court determined that the respondents (plaintiffs
below)
simply failed to carry their burden of proving that discriminatory purpose was a
motivating factor in the Village's decision. This conclusion ends the constitutiohal
inquiry. The Court of Appeals' further finding that the Village's decision carried a
discriminatory "ultimate effect" is without independent constitutional significance.
Id. at 565. The case was remanded for the lower court to deal with the statutory claims made.
It seems likely that there will be a heavier burden on future plaintiffs to prove a
violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. It remains to be seen
exactly what effect this will have on Title VI actions.
1642 U.S.C. § 2000d-I (1970).
'1Mandel v. HEW, 411 F. Supp. 542 (D. Md. 1976). See notes 38-45 infra & text
accompanying.
18See discussion infra note 68.
'
9See Comment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964-Implementation and Impact, 36
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 824, 843 (1968).20Note, Board of Public Instruction v. Finch: Unwarranted Compromise of Title VI's
Termination Sanction, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 1113 (1970).
2See [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2355, 2401.
221d. at 2425 (Remarks of Rep. George Meader).
23Id.
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however, is merely one opinion, and there is no way of knowing whether it
is truly representative of the other Congressmen who voted for the Act.24
This Representative's beliefs were emphasized, however, in a minority
report of the bill made part of the legislative history. The report included
an extensive list of "programs" which could theoretically be affected by a
termination of funds.25 The object was obviously to present a "parade of
horribles"; all of these "programs" could be denied funding under the Act,
depriving a massive number of people of deserved local funds and services.
The listed "programs" were particular grants or loans.
It appears from the legislative history that Congress focused on
"pinpointing" 26 the cutoff of funds to those recipients who used federal
money to perpetuate discriminatory practices.2 7 Congress did not intend
for discrimination in school programs to result in the termination of
federal funding for unrelated programs such as highways or welfare. 28 In
response to those who feared that discrimination in one school district
might cause a loss of funds for an entire state's educational programs, the
original bill was amended to pinpoint the termination of funds to the
offending program and political entity.29 Unfortunately, congressional
concern for particular interests does not help to "pinpoint" an appropriate
definition of "program" for practical application.
The Narrow View: Primary and Secondary Education
Some courts have taken the approach that section 602, notably the
"pinpoint provision,"3 0 should be read narrowly when applied to elemen-
tary and secondary schools; only the aid recipient most limited in size
which was discriminating would have its funds terminated. Moreover,
funds only indirectly tied to discriminatory acts would not be affected.
A case that defined "program" narrowly was Board of Public Instruc-
tion v. Finch.31 A county had been receiving federal money under three
2 4For a brief discussion of the difficulties of depending on legislative history, see Note,
Board of Public Instruction v. Finch: Unwarranted Compromise of Title VI's Termination
Sanction, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 1113, 1117 (1970), citing Witherspoon, Administrative
Discretion to Determine Statutory Meaning: "The High Road," 35 TEx. L. REV. 63, 74 (1956).
25A complete list of the programs cited by Reps. Richard H. Poff and William C.
Cramer can be found at [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2355, 2471-73.26The pinpoint provision of section 602 reads:
[B]ut such termination or refusal [of federal financial assistance] shall be limited to
the particular political entity, or part thereof, or other recipient as to whom such a
finding has been made and, shall be limited in its effect to the particular program,
or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has been so found ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1970).
27 [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2355, 2487 (views of William M. McCullouch,
John V. Lindsey, William T. Cahill, Garner E. Schriver, Clark MacGregor, Charles McC.
Mathiis, Jr., arid James E. Bromwell); 110 CONG. REc. 7103 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Long).
28110 CONG. REc. 7059, 7067 (1964).
29See Comment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964-Implementation and Impact,
36 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 824, 832-36 (1968).
30The text of the pinpoint provision is found in note 26 supra.
S1414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969).
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grants. Each one had its own objective, required separate plans and
administrative approval and had individual provisions for appellate
review.32 HEW terminated all three federal grants because the county board
had failed to make satisfactory progress toward student and faculty
desegregation. Parties affected by the breadth of the agency's action sought
judicial review. 33 HEW claimed that the term "program" was not meant to
be construed so narrowly that each grant had to be judged separately by
the agency. 34 The court disagreed. Judge Goldberg, speaking for the court,
held that "[s]chools and programs are not condemned en masse ... the
termination power reaches only those programs which would utilize federal
money for unconstitutional ends. Under this procedure each program
receives its own 'day in court.' ,,35 He also noted that even if HEW were
correct in assuming that "program" was meant to encompass anything so
broad as all educational activities administered by the county board, the
statutory phrase "or part thereof" in section 60236 must carry some
meaning, viz., the individual grants given to a school board for separate
activities.37 Thus, HEW was not permitted to cut off funds for such
programs as adult education and supplementary educational centers
without findings that each program was either administered in a discrimi-
natory manner or could not be separated from a discriminatory environment.
Another recent case giving the term "program" a narrow scope is
Mandel v. HEW.3 8 In Mandel, governmental officials were enjoined from
cutting off funds to Maryland colleges and universities and Baltimore city
schools on the ground that HEW had not first sought voluntary compli-
ance with the Act.39 The court severely reprimanded the agency for
refusing to specify to city and state officials which educational programs
were found discriminatory, and cited Board of Public Instruction v. Finch"
with approval.4" The district court opined that it was virtually impossible
320ne grant was for education of children from low-income families, one for supple-
mentary educational centers and one for adult education. Id. at 1074 nn. 5-9.
S3Not all the cases discussed herein present the same procedural posture as Board of Pub.
Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969), i.e., a request for judicial review of an
agency decision to terminate federal funds. Some are suits by citizens requesting equitable
relief to compel an agency to act in conformance with Title VI and expedite the integration
process, see Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973); some are suits against the
federal agency itself for discriminating in its policies, see Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284
(1976); and some cases arise before reaching the stage of termination of funds where the
offending governmental entity may sue to prevent enforcement of an agency integration plan,
see Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). However, the procedural posture should
have no effect on the definition of "program" for Title VI purposes. See note 83 infra.
34414 F.2d at 1076.
351d. at 1078.
3642 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1970).37Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d at 1077-78, 1078 n.14.
38411 F. Supp. 542 (D. Md. 1976), appeal docketed, No. 76-1494 (4th. Cir. June 30, 1976).
39The action taken by HEW in this case resulted from the decision in Adams v.
Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See notes 47-50 infra & text accompanying.
40414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969).
4IHEW was willing to concede that federal financial assistance would not ultimately be
terminated to all state and city educational "programs" because one portion of local
[Vol. 52:651
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for a city or state to comply with the strictures of Title VI when the scope
of the term "program" was not clear. The court stated: "It is paradoxical
to assume that a recipient of federal funding, such as a state or a large city,
could rectify any discriminatory programs within its system without ever
being informed which program was considered by HEW to be operating
discriminatively." 42
Although the court dealt harshly with the agency's actions,43 it could
not itself state unequivocally what funds Title VI permits to be cut off. The
court could only guess at congressional intent and try to sort out the
various possible interpretations. On appeal HEW argued that the court
had misinterpreted Board of Public Instruction v. Finch.4 HEW claimed
to have been acting against discrimination in the entire higher education
system of Maryland and, therefore, argued that a statewide cutoff of funds
was permissible.45 Although the Circuit Court of Appeals has yet to decide
the appeal, acceptafice of such a position may result in the agency's merely
having to demonstrate that, after a finding of discrimination has been
made, a particular program cannot be dealt with separately, thus per-
mitting the cutoff of funds to both. Something approaching this view has,
operations was discriminatory. However, the Department stressed that its only duty was to
find any discrimination by the recipient; the burden should then be shifted to the aid recipient
to prove which, if any, programs were not administered in a discriminatory fashion and were
not tainted by a discriminatory environment. Brief for Appellant at 57-62, Mandel v. HEW,
appeal docketed, No. 76-1494 (4th Cir. June 30, 1976) [on file with the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL].
See also Note, School Desegregation and the Office of Education Guidelines, 55 GFo. L.J. 325,
344-45 (1966).
42Mandel v. HEW, 411 F. Supp. 542, 558 (D. Md. 1976). The court called HEW's actions
whimsical and arbitrary and said the Department acted "with palpable disregard of the
statutory prerequisites ..... Id. at 559.
4Sld. at 558.
44Brief for Appellant at 57-62, Mandel v. HEW, appeal docketed, No. 76-1494 (4th Cir.
June 30, 1976).
451d., citing Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See note 47 infra &
text accompanying. The court in Board of Public Instruction v. Finch indicated that such a
cutoff was possible:
In finding that a termination of funds under Title IV [sic] of the Civil Rights Act
must be made on a program by program basis, we do not mean to indicate that a
program must be considered in isolation from its context. To say that a program in
a school is free from discrimination because everyone in the school is at liberty to
partake of its benefits may or may not be a tenable position. Clearly the racial
composition of a school's student body, or the racial composition of its faculty may
have an effect upon the particular program in question. But this may not always be
the case. In deference to that possibility, the administrative agency seeking to cut off
federal funds must make findings of fact indicating either that a particular program
is itself administered in a discriminatory manner, or is so affected by discriminatory
practices elsewhere in the school system that it thereby becomes discriminatory.
Only in this way can a reviewing court know that the effects of the order entered by
the agency have been limited to programs not in compliance with the Civil Rights
Act.
414 F.2d 1068, 1078-79 (5th Cir. 1969).
A similar argument has been advanced by HEW in its appeal concerning the school
system of Baltimore. Brief for Appellant, Mayor of Baltimore v. Mathews, appeal docketed,
No. 76-1493 (4th Cir. June 30, 1976) [on file with the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL].
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however, already been employed in connection with higher education
systems.
A Broader Analysis: Higher Education
In the context of primary and secondary education, the courts have
tended to equate a section 602 "program" with a school system or district.4 6
But in Adams v. Richardson47 the court defined "program" broadly,
justifying differential treatment of primary and secondary schools, as
opposed to institutions of higher learning, on the basis of their different
needs and the different experience of HEW in dealing with each.
Primary and secondary schools were apparently dealt with on a
district-by-district basis, 48 as distinct from the problem of integrating
higher education, a problem which "must be dealt with on a
statewide rather than a school-by-school basis."49 Adams, which affords
HEW some leniency in the review of its handling of higher education
because of its lack of experience in that field,50 has opened the door to a
broad definition of "program," for Title VI purposes, as a whole state. 5'
46E.g., United States v. Jefferson County Bd., 372 F.2d 836, decree corrected, 380 F.2d 385
(5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967); Lee v. Macon County Bd., 270 F. Supp. 859(M.D. Ala. 1967); cf. Board of Pub. Instruction v. Cohen, 413 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1969).
47480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973).48This action may now be mandated by analogy to Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717(1974), where the Court determined that school integration plans could not cross district lines
where only one district was shown to have discriminated. The Court may thus have defined a
"program" for funding under Title VI as well, at least as far as primary and secondary
educa tional systems are concerned.49Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1973).50After the court's order in Adams v. Richardson, HEW made some effort at gaining
compliance with the Act by offending school districts but did not move toward enforcement
proceedings; plaintiffs sued again to force HEW to act according to section 602. The court
said:
HEW has often delayed too long in ascertaining whether a complaint or other
information of racial discrimination constitutes a violation of Title VI. HEW has
also frequently failed to commence enforcement proceedings by administrative
notice of hearing or any other means authorized by law although the efforts to
obtain voluntary compliance have not succeeded during a substantial period of
time.
Adams v. Weinberger, 391 F. Supp. 269, 273 (D.D.C. 1975). The court ordered HEW to follow
the 1973 order and issued a supplemental order of its own to the agency to, inter alia,
commence enforcement proceedings where appropriate. The court did not go so far as to
order termination of funds, however, nor did it expand on a definition of "program." Id.511n Georgia v. Mitchell, 450 F.2d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1971), a racial quota was found to
violate the fifth and fourteenth amendments; HEW cut off funds for education in the whole
state. The court, in adopting HEW's broad analysis of the statute, said:
[T]he Department of Health, Education and Welfare was justified in utilizing the
provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1, which authorizes the termination of federal
assistance in a state which once sponsored or aided racial discrimination in its
schools and has failed to take affirmative steps to cure the impact of its past policies.
450 F.2d at 1320 (emphasis added).
This case was actually a collateral attack by the state on an unreported unappealed case
in which the district court had enjoined the state board of education from disbursing public
funds to those school districts which did not adopt satisfactory desegregation plans. United
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A slightly different approach was taken recently by a district court in
New York.52 A woman alleged that she had been unlawfully discriminated
against by a private law school which had denied her admission but had
admitted less qualified applicants under its minority admissions program.
She asserted various governmental connections with the law school and the
university53 and made claims under Title VI and Title IX.5 4 In denying the
States v. Georgia, No. 69-12972 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 17, 1969). The circuit court chose to reach the
merits anyway. Although the termination of funds may ultimately have affected only
particular school districts, conforming to the traditional approach to primary and secondary
level education, the circuit court permitted HEW to act at the state level.2Stewart v. New York Univ., No. 74-4126 (S.D.N.Y. March 16, 1976).
5SThe connections claimed by the plaintiff were tax exemptions, government financing
of some university buildings including the law school's dormitory, student loans and grants,
grants from government sources and the public functions of the university and the law school.
Id. at 5-7.
54Sections 601 and 602 of Title VI, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d, 2000(d-1 (1970), are quoted in full at
notes 1 & 2 supra.
Title IX, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1972) states:
(a) No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance,
except that:
(1) in regard to admissions to educational institutions, this section
shall apply only to institutions of vocational education, professional
education, and graduate higher education, and to public institutions of
undergraduate higher education;
(2) in regard to admissions to educational institutions, this section
shall not apply (A) for one year from June 23, 1972, nor for six years after
June 23, 1972, in the case of an educational institution which has begun
the process of changing from being an institution which admits only
students of one sex to being an institution which admits students of both
sexes, but only if it is carrying out a plan for such a change which is
approved by the Commissioner of Education or (B) for seven years from
the date an educational institution begins the process of changing from
being an institution which admits only students of only one sex to being
an institution which admits students of both sexes, but only if it is
carrying out a plan for such a change which is approved by the
Commissioner of Education, whichever is the later;
(3) this section shall not apply to an educational institution which
is controlled by a religious organization if the application of this
subsection would not be consistent with the religious tenets of such
organization;
(4) this section shall not apply to an educational institution whose
primary purpose is the training of individuals for the military services of
the United States, or the merchant marine;
(5) in regard to admissions this section shall not apply to any
public institution of undergraduate higher education which is an institu-
tion that traditionally and continually from its establishment has had a
policy of admitting only students of one sex, and
(b) Nothing contained in subsection (a) of this section shall be interpreted to
require any educational institution to grant preferential or disparate treatment to
the members of one sex on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to
the total number or percentage of persons of that sex participating in or receiving
the benefits of any federally supported program or activity, in comparison with the
total number of percentage of persons of that sex in any community, State, section,
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plaintiff's claims the court's determination amounted to a decision that the
law school's minority admissions program did not constitute a "program"
for Title VI purposes. The court did not find a sufficient nexus between
the university, various divisions of which received federal financial aid, and
the law school's allegedly discriminatory minority admissions program.
The court indicated that the discrimination must be found in an area larger
than one policy which is not directly funded by federal monies. Although
the plaintiff sought a broad analysis of the statute, this court, in holding
that a "program" was "broader" then contended, ultimately arrived at a
result which could be called narrow. It found that the purposes of Title VI
would best be served by not terminating unrelated educational funds of the
university and the law school on the basis of discrimination alleged to exist
in one small part of a subdivision of the university, even under the
pinpoint provision.55
A Narrow Analysis: Housing
The courts have also had to deal with Title VI requirements in the field
of housing. Some have chosen to interpret the Act narrowly, paralleling
narrow interpretations in the educational field.
A 1972 Seventh Circuit case, Gautreaux v. Romney,56 while not
specifically defining "program," held that discrimination by a city housing
authority did not support the district court's order that HUD withhold
funds from the Model Cities Program, which was not discriminatory.
Judge Sprecher, in a strong dissent, argued that HUD was sufficiently
or other area: Provided, That this subsection shall not be construed to prevent the
consideration in any hearing or proceeding under this chapter of statistical evidence
tending to show that such an imbalance exists with respect to the participation in,
or receipt of the benefits of, any such program or activity by the members of one sex.
(c) For purposes of this chapter an educational institution means any public
or private preschool, elementary, or secondary school, or any institution of
vocational, professional, or higher education, except that in the case of an
educational institution composed of more than one school, college, or department
which are administratively separate units, such term means each such school,
college, or department.
55Stewart v. New York Univ., No. 74-4126 at 14-16 (S.D.N.Y. March 16, 1976).
One state court specifically defined a "public educational program" as a junior
college that was funded in all aspects by the city, but the court's emphasis focused on what
made the institution public for a condemnation proceeding rather than what constituted a
"program" for Title VI purposes. Sheppard v. DeKalb County Bd., 220 Ga. 219, 138 S.E.2d
271 (1964).
Another court determined that all mental institutions in the state of Alabama comprised
a program from which funds were withheld upon a finding of segregation in those
institutions. Marable v. Alabama Mental Health Bd., 297 F. Supp. 291 (M.D. Ala. 1969). See
note 7 supra.
Finally, all of the city of Chicago's revenue-sharing plans were considered a single
program subject to loss of funds when the city's police department, which received about 75
percent of those funds, was found to be discriminatory. United States v. City of Chicago, 395
F. Supp. 329 (N.D. Ill. 1975). See note 8 supra. The court found that this case could be
distinguished from Gautreaux v. Romney, 457 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1972).
56457 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1972).
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involved with both the housing authority's policies and the Model Cities
Program to justify termination of the latter's financial assistance. 57 But the
court held that the policy of the Act would be violated by withholding
funds from the Model Cities Program because there was an insufficient
nexus between that program and the activities of the housing authority.5 8
Once again there was disagreement over the scope of "program" under
Title VI with little definitive authority supporting either view. The
majority felt that there ought to be some balancing 59 between the
alternative extremes of causing hardship to beneficiaries of city programs
by withholding funds and allowing discriminatory practices to continue
unchecked. 60 It is doubtful, however, whether the Act can be effectively
applied if such a balancing test is employed. Aside from the requirement
that the agency seek voluntary compliance before proceeding to adminis-
trative cutoff of funds, the terms of section 602 require that the govern-
ment not be a party to discrimination by financing an offending "program
or activity." Since the terms of the provision are straightforward and
absolute, it would seem wholly inconsistent with section 602 to follow the
balancing approach suggested by the majority.61 But a different dimension
has been added in the determination of the scope of the administrative
cutoff of funds: the geographic boundaries of the termination.
The geographic approach was embraced by the Supreme Court in
affirming the Seventh Circuit's 1974 decision, in what was essentially the
571d. at 129-40.5 There were special circumstances, however, meriting this refusal to uphold the district
court since HUD had been ordered to cut off funds in order to compel the city housing
authority, a non-party, to desegregate its facilities and use nondiscriminatory procedures in
the future. 457 F.2d at 126. See also Van Dusen, Civil Rights and Housing, 5 URB. LAw. 576
(1973). The author, a former HUD Under-Secretary, opposes shutting off grant programs to
achieve "unrelated goals" though such action is HUD's principal available sanction. He
believes cases similar to Gautreaux have the ultimate effect of bringing the wheels of
government to a halt. Id. at 582-87.59The Gautreaux court, citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd., 402 U.S. 1 (1971),
said:
In a Civil Rights case, the Court's task is "to correct, by a balancing of the
individual and collective interests, the condition that offends the Constitution." [402
U.S. at 16.] But here there was no balancing of interests. The rights of the many
thousands of beneficiaries of the Model Cities Program were entirely ignored.
457 F.2d at 127.
In Swann, the Supreme Court had advised:
In seeking to define even in broad and general terms how far this remedial
power extends it is important to remember that judicial powers may be exercised
only on the basis of a constitutional violation. Remedial judicial authority does not
put judges automatically in the shoes of school authorities whose powers are
plenary. Judicial authority enters only when local authority defaults.
402 U.S. at 16.
The majority in Gautreaux apparently felt that a gap sufficient to allow the district
court to require termination of Model Cities funds had not been opened by the local
authority's activities in perpetuating segregated housing through site selection.
60Gautreaux v. Romney, 457 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1972).
lSee Recent Cases, 86 HARV. L. REv. 427 (1972).
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same case as had been before it in 1972.62 The Court held that for the
purposes of cutting off funds under Title VI, a "program" could include
all housing funded by HUD in the entire metropolitan area of Chicago. 63
The Supreme Court permitted a metropolitan remedy to be fashioned if
necessary to eliminate discrimination. 64 The housing funds for the entire
metropolitan area of Chicago would be those terminated if there were
insufficient compliance with the lower court's order. The Supreme Court
thus acquiesced in a definition of "program" within the confines of
congressional intent which is best suited to ending discrimination. The
effect of the decision is that HUD must first look to the purposes served by
the federal funding and then decide the geographical extent of the area
affected by the discriminatory practices of the entity receiving the funds.
THE NEED FOR FLEXIBILITY IN INTERPRETING "PROGRAM"
Title VI provides discretion for federal agencies seeking to eliminate
racial discrimination by aid recipients. First, the agency must seek
voluntary compliance with section 601. If this approach fails, the agency
has a choice: it may either cut off funds, or it may use "any other means
authorized by law."' 65 The agency may, for example, refer the case to the
Attorney General for enforcement. There are also a number of adminis-
trative remedies available other than fund termination.66 As has been
noted: "This choice of enforcement methods was intended to allow funding
agencies flexibility in responding to instances of discrimination. ' ' 67 How-
ever, flexibility to allow agencies to avoid enforcement of Title V168 is not
I
62Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 503 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1974), aff'd sub nom. Hills
v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976). The 1972 and 1974 decisions of the Seventh Circuit are not
in conflict because the 1972 decision raised the question of whether a "program" covered
funds intended for uses entirely separate from those administered by the discriminating entity,
whereas the 1974 decision concerned funds intended for the same uses but questioned how
great an area could be affected by the cutoff: the city alone or the entire metropolitan district.63Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
641d.
65For full text of sections 601 & 602 see notes 1 & 2 supra.66Guidelines for the Enforcement of Title VI, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 28 C.F.R. § 50.3
at 252-53 (1976).67Hearings on Miscellaneous Proposals Regarding the Civil Rights of Persons Within
the Jurisdiction of the United States Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 4 at 1381-82 (Att'y. Gen. Kennedy), 1544 (Sec'y. Celebrezze,
HEW), 1890 (Rep. Celler), 2758 (1963) (Rep. Libonati); 110 CONG. REc. 2467 (1964) (Rep.
Gill); Note, Enforcing a Congressional Mandate: LEAA and Civil Rights, 85 YALE L.J. 721,
723 (1976).68Discretion as to what remedies to pursue under section 602 has generally resulted in
inaction by federal agencies. See UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL
CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT: A REASSEMENT (1973); Note, Enforcing a Congressional
Mandate: LEAA and Civil Rights, 85 YALE L.J. 721, 724 n.17 (1976).
For example, in approximately six years (July 1964 to March 1970) HEW commenced
about 600 administrative proceedings against school districts found to be out of compliance
with section 601. In 400 of these proceedings compliance was obtained with the mere threat of
fund termination. In the remaining 200 cases funds were cut off; HEW subsequently found
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the objective of such discretion. Rather, discretion is to be exercised so as
to foster the use of the remedy most efficacious in the particular
circumstances. In the context of the present discussion, the necessary
flexibility is found in the definition of "program," i.e., the scope of fund
termination to force movement toward nondiscrimination in federally
funded activities.
The term "program" could refer to either local programs or federal
grant programs. Some courts, as that in Board of Public Instruction v.
Finch,69 have preferred the latter interpretation, but it has been suggested 70
that such an approach does not really make sense. Section 602 of Title VI
refers to a program or activity for which federal financial assistance is
available. As a federal program does not receive "federal aid," the term
"program" must mean a local program. It would be logical to assume that
the use of the word "program" in the pinpoint provision has the same
meaning. However, this only makes the meaning of "program" slightly
less ambiguous as it removes only one of many possible interpretations.
Ultimately, federal impetus and stringent sanctions are necessary to
make Title VI work. Local political entities are not inclined to take the
initiative; the impetus to eliminate discrimination must come from the
federal government. It must be able to move swiftly and efficiently, and the
threat to terminate financial assistance must be real and substantial. The
federal government, however, cannot provide this impetus if it is forced to
take an inordinate amount of time to pin down each discriminatory act.
Futhermore, if loss of federal funds which constitute a relatively minute
portion of the aid received is the sole sanction for violating the Act, the
local entity will feel little pressure to act. As a result, stringent sanctions
must be devised and courts must be responsive to this need when
interpreting the word "program." Such stringent sanctions would involve
relatively quick action by the agency to end funding for as large a political
entity as necessary to encourage voluntary local compliance without prior
that the districts were then complying with section 601 and the aid was reinstated. VI UNITED
STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFoRT-1974, at
384-85 (1975). Although fund termination is obviously an excellent method of enforcement, it
is rarely used. The Civil Rights Commission found that every agency it examined in 1974 had
failed to end financial aid where it' would have been appropriate. Id. at 653, 762-97.
This problem has been recognized by the courts as well. In Adams v. Weinberger, 391 F.
Supp. 269 (D.D.C. 1975), the court recognized that although there was value in attempting
voluntary settlement (as well as a statutory requirement), "there appears to be an over-reliance
by HEW on the use of voluntary negotiations over protracted time periods and a 'reluctance in
recent years to use the administrative sanction process where school districts are known to be
in noncompliance ....... 391 F. Supp. at 271, citing III UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFoRT-1974 at 131 n.1 (1975).
69414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969).
70 Brief for Appellant at 65 n.42, Mayor of Baltimore v. Mathews, appeal docketed, No.
76-1493 (4th Cir. June 30, 1976). Cf. Note, Board of Public Instruction v. Finch: Unwarranted
Compromise of Title VI's Termination Sanction, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 1113, 1138-39 (1970); cf.
also Note, School Desegregation and the Office of Education Guidelines, 55 GEO. L.J. 325,
344-45 (1966).
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fund termination. Thus, it may well be that the answer to the problem is
to leave the definition in a flexible form and conclude that each situation
merits its own course of action. That is certainly not a novel approach to
the problem. Principles of equity, which have always authorized the courts
to fit the remedy to the problem, have been relied on by the United States
Supreme Court in resolving similar problems. The scope of a court's
equitable powers, after a right and violation are shown, is broad, "for
breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies." 7' As stated by
the Court in Hecht Co. v. Bowles:
The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to
do equity and to mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case.
Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it. The qualities of mercy
and practicality have made equity the instrument for nice adjustment and
reconciliation between the public interest and private needs as well as
between competing private claims.7 2
This flexible approach provides guidance for courts facing the problem of
interpreting the scope of the word "program" for Title VI purposes.
Public institutions of higher learning are generally managed on a
statewide basis and are likely to have uniform statewide policies. State
universities and colleges are open on an equal basis to all state residents
and are funded from state taxes. Indeed, it would be improper for there to
be vastly different policies and standards from one branch of the same state
university to another. Therefore, HEW should focus on the entire state's
higher educational activities in determining first whether discrimination
exists and later whether to terminate funding. The cutoff should be limited
to aid affecting higher education and would not affect, for example,
highways or housing funds. This approach is consistent with HEW's
intention, as witnessed by its appeal from Mandel v. HEW.7 1
On the elementary and secondary school levels, the Supreme Court has
found that these schools traditionally are governed at the local level.7 4
Succinctly stated, the accepted belief is: "An essential, prominent, and
traditional function of local government is the maintenance and operation
of a public school system." 75 There have been a number of rationales
71Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971); Note, Interdistrict
Desegregation: The Remaining Options, 28 STAN. L. REV. 521, 531-35, 551-53 (1976).
72321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1944).
73411 F. Supp. 542 (D. Md. 1976). See notes 41 & 45 supra 8c text accompanying.
74E.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). The Court stated:
Boundary lines may be bridged where there has been a constitutional violation
calling for interdistrict relief, but the notion that school district lines may be
casually ignored or treated as a mere administrative convenience is contrary to the
history of public education in our country. No single tradition in public education
is more deeply rooted than local control over the operation of schools; local
autonomy has long been thought essential both to the maintenance of community
concern and support for public schools and to quality of the educational process.
Id. at 741-42.
75Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARV.
L. REv. 564, 583 (1965).
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presented to emphasize the necessity for this practice. Geographic criteria
are almost universally mentioned as factors in requiring local control of
schools. There is a desire to minimize the need for transportation of
children, to save time and to lessen costs, inconveniences and hazards
associated with any transportation program.7 6 Another factor is parent
interest, which will also be encouraged if there is a possibility that parental
influence will have some effect, a more likely occurrence when there is local
control of the schools. Furthermore, local control gives a community a
chance to contribute as much as desired in tax money to improve the
schools for its own children. 7 Consequently, the term "program" should
cover all funds for educational purposes in the school "district," as defined
by local practice. The Board of Public Instruction v. Finch approach is
too strict and unworkable in forcing HEW to follow every federal dollar
and determine whether it serves a discriminatory end.
In housing, HUD has the right to look to an entire metropolitan
housing district to ascertain that there is no discrimination.78 In contrast to
the treatment of schools, public housing is not considered a locally
controlled program;79 furthermore, it is generally administered at the
federal level by HUD.O HUD is seen as better able to put national housing
policies81 into effect than local housing authorities; the agency deals with
"housing market areas," and is not limited to city boundaries in carrying
out it§ duties. As stated by the Supreme Court:
That HUD recognizes this reality is evident in its administration of federal
housing assistance programs through "housing maket areas" encompas-
sing "the geographic area 'within which all dwelling units . . .' are in
competition with one another as alternatives for the users of housing
... " The housing market area "usually extends beyond the city limits"
and in the larger markets "may extend into several adjoining counties."8 2
76ld. at 566-67.
77Cf. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 48-50 (1973).78Board of Pub. Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969). See notes 31-37 supra
& text accompanying; Note, School Desegregation and the Office of Education Guidelines, 55
GEO. L.J. 325, 344-45 (1966).
79See Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
80 Brief for Respondent at 4-8, Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976) and authorities
cited therein [on file with the INDIANA LAW JOURNAL].
81E.g., some policy declarations are: "[T]he realization as soon as feasible of the goal of
a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family ...." 42 U.S.C.
g 1441 (1970); "to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the
United States," 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1970); to remedy the housing shortage for low-income
families, 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1970); 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (Supp. V 1975); to prevent discrimination in
federal housing programs, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970); to admiriister federal housing programs
in a way as to affirmatively further fair housing, 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d)(5) (1970); to reduce the
concentration of low-income persons in central cities, 42 U.S.C. § 5301(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975);
and to foster the special deconcentration of housing opportunities for low-income persons, 42
U.S.C. § 5301(c)(6) (Supp. V 1975).82Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 299 (1976), citing DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND
URBAN DEVELOPMENT, FHA, TECHNIQUES OF HOUSING MARKEr ANALYSIS 8, 12 (Jan. 1970)
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If there is discrimination in housing facilities, in the way sites are selected
or the way tenants or potential tenants are treated, then aid can be withheld
from that metropolitan area, including all funds relative to the "subject" of
housing.
Similar decisions can be made as to highways, mental institutions,
public transportation or any other subject. The definition of "program"
should be determined on two levels. First, the agency should deal with the
subject through the entity by which it is normally governed: by state,
county, city or other special district. Then it should focus on the particular
type of interest-higher education, lower levels of education, housing,
highways, welfare-to deterrh'ine the breadth of the discriminatory impact.
Such a two-step flexible analysis will insure that a proper balance is struck
in line with the intent of the statute. Federal money will not be used to
support discrimination, nor will the cutoff of funds cause too many
innocent beneficiaries of federal aid to suffer.83
Although an open definition of "program" in Title VI may indeed
cause an initial increment in administrative headaches, the increase in
paperwork is a small price to pay in order to gain such a powerful tool for
the elimination of discrimination in federally financed programs.
CONCLUSION
The administrative power to terminate federal assistance to programs
under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 196484 has caused considerable
consternation in the courts. Attempts to fashion a single definition of the
quoting THE INSTITUTE FOR URBAN LAND USE AND HOUSING STUDIES, HOUSING MARKET
ANALYSIS: A STUDY OF THEORY AND METHODS ch. II (1953).
8 Cases ripe for a definition of "program" may reach the courts at different admini-
strative states. See note 33 supra. When an agency has already taken action and the case is
presented for judicial review, the agency's construction of a statute is generally accorded "great
weight." Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965). However, a court may decide to fully review an
agency decision by characterizing it as primarily a question of law, a matter for de novo
hearing by the courts. See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932). If a case reaches the
courts before the exhaustion of administrative remedies, judicial intervention should
ordinarily be stayed, Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938), unless an
exception to that rule applies, as when the agency has acted in clear violation of a statute,
Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958), or where judicial review after final agency determination
would provide an inadequate remedy, Jewel Companies, Inc. v. FTC, 432 F.2d 1155 (7th Cir.
1970).
Judicial imposition of prior restraint is an extraordinary remedy which is granted only
after a strong showing of necessity is made to overcome a high standard, particularly in regard
to administrative agencies. Wolf Corp. v. SEC, 317 F.2d 139, 142-43 (D.C. Cir. 1963). It may be
that a case such as Mandel v. HEW, 411 F. Supp. 542 (D. Md. 1976), does not even belong in
the courts at its present stage. See Taylor v. Cohen, 405 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1968).
Regardless of when the courts permit a case to be heard, the definition of "program" for
Title VI purposes should remain the same. And it should be applied in the same way by the
agency before judicial intervention as well. It is a matter of statutory interpretation which
need not depend on the procedural posture of the case, once the issue is settled. The proposed
variable definition would not be affected by the stage of the proceeding.
8442 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-d4 (1970).
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term "program" have resulted in confusion over how niuch funding should
be terminated owing to discrimination in a federally assisted project. The
problem cannot be solved by fashioning one inflexible definition to cover
all that Title VI encompasses. A malleable definition is the necessary and
appropriate response.
Primary and secondary educational programs are traditionally treated
as a unit on a district-by-district basis; so should they be treated for Title VI
purposes. However, this method does not suit higher educational systems;
these are generally managed on a statewide basis. Housing, on the other
hand, is divided into metropolitan areas by HUD and funded accordingly.8 5
There is no apparent reason for preventing HUD from examining these
metropolitan housing areas as a whole for determination of discrimination
and funding termination under Title VI. Similarly, the approach to other
federal aid recipients for Title VI purposes should be flexible and
individualized according to the way the monies are normally governed and
the area actually served by the discriminatory program. In this way the
federal agencies will best be able to effectuate the overall policies of the Act.
MYRNA E. FRIEDMAN
85Brief for Respondent, Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
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